



**USC** University of  
Southern California

# Collision Channel

## Capacity Region and a Mutual Information Game

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
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University of Southern California

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October 3-6 2017 - Monticello, Illinois**


# Underwater acoustic sensor networks



**Packet collisions**    **Long propagation delays** → **Lack of feedback**

# Collision channel

- **Widely used in wireless communications**
- $>1$  simultaneous transmission results in a **collision**
- Users decide whether to transmit or not



Input alphabet


$$\mathcal{X}_i = \{\mathbf{S}, x_i(1), x_i(2), \dots, x_i(q_i)\}, \quad i \in \{1, 2\}$$

$q_i + 1$  symbols

**S** is the silent symbol

$q_i$  non-silent symbols  
( $\log q_i$  payload bits)

# Collision channel



Silent symbol: **S**

Collision symbol: **C**


$$\mathcal{X}_i = \{\mathbf{S}, x_i(1), x_i(2), \dots, x_i(q_i)\}, \quad i \in \{1, 2\}$$

$$\mathcal{Y} = \mathcal{X}_1 \cup \mathcal{X}_2 \cup \{\mathbf{C}\}$$

$$\mathcal{X}_1 \cap \mathcal{X}_2 = \{\mathbf{S}\}$$

Packets from **different** users  
have **different** headers!


# Collision channel



# The implicit binary noiseless channel

$$U_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } X_i \neq \mathbf{S} \\ 0 & \text{if } X_i = \mathbf{S} \end{cases}$$

← transmit  
← do not transmit



**Success**

$$U_1 = 1, U_2 = 0$$

**Silence**

$$U_1 = 0, U_2 = 0$$

**Collision**

$$U_1 = 1, U_2 = 1$$


From the channel output we can always recover  $U_1$  and  $U_2$

$$H(U_1, U_2|Y) = 0$$

# The implicit binary noiseless channel


**Each user sends at least**

$H(U_i)$  bits/channel use




**Success**

$$U_1 = 1, U_2 = 0$$



**Silence**

$$U_1 = 0, U_2 = 0$$



**Collision**

$$U_1 = 1, U_2 = 1$$

# Capacity of the collision channel

## Theorem 1

The capacity region of the Collision MAC is the convex hull of  $(R_1, R_2)$  satisfying


$$\begin{aligned} R_1 &\leq H_b(\theta_1) + \log q_1 \cdot (1 - \theta_1) \cdot \theta_2 \\ R_2 &\leq H_b(\theta_2) + \log q_2 \cdot (1 - \theta_2) \cdot \theta_1 \end{aligned}$$

$\theta_i$  is the probability of user  $i$  being **silent**  
 $\log q_i$  is number of payload bits of user  $i$

$$\theta_i = \Pr(X_i = \mathbf{S})$$

$$H_b(\theta) = \theta \log \frac{1}{\theta} + (1 - \theta) \log \frac{1}{1 - \theta}$$

**binary entropy function**





# Sketch of proof


The capacity region of a DMAC is the convex-hull of  $(R_1, R_2)$  satisfying:

$$R_1 \leq I(X_1; Y | X_2)$$

$$R_2 \leq I(X_2; Y | X_1)$$

$$R_1 + R_2 \leq I(X_1, X_2; Y)$$

$$P_{X_1 X_2} = P_{X_1} P_{X_2}$$




# Sketch of proof

## Lemma 1

The capacity achieving distributions are **uniform** on the **non-silent** symbols

$$I(X_i; Y | X_j) = H(U_i) + H(X_i | U_i = 1) \times \Pr(U_i = 1) \cdot \Pr(U_j = 0)$$



$$H(X_i | U_i = 1) \leq \log q_i$$

$$I(X_i; Y | X_j) \leq H(U_i) + \log q_i \cdot \Pr(U_i = 1) \cdot \Pr(U_j = 0)$$

# Sketch of proof

## Lemma 2

The sum-rate inequality is **redundant**


$$\begin{aligned} I(X_1, X_2; Y) &\stackrel{(a)}{=} H(Y) && \text{(a) The channel is deterministic} \\ &\stackrel{(b)}{=} H(Y, U_1, U_2) && \text{(b) Implicit channel property} \\ &\stackrel{(c)}{=} H(U_1) + H(U_2) + H(Y|U_1, U_2) && \text{(c) Chain rule} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} H(Y|U_1, U_2) &= H(X_1|U_1 = 1) \Pr(U_1 = 1) \Pr(U_2 = 0) \\ &\quad + H(X_2|U_2 = 1) \Pr(U_2 = 1) \Pr(U_1 = 0) \end{aligned}$$

$$I(X_1, X_2; Y) = I(X_1; Y|X_2) + I(X_2; Y|X_1)$$

# Computing the capacity region


$$\begin{aligned} &\text{maximize} && \mu \left[ H_b(\theta_1) + \log q_1 \cdot (1 - \theta_1) \cdot \theta_2 \right] + (1 - \mu) \left[ H_b(\theta_2) + \log q_2 \cdot (1 - \theta_2) \cdot \theta_1 \right] \\ &\text{subject to} && 0 \leq \theta_i \leq 1, \quad i \in \{1, 2\} \end{aligned}$$



**symmetric case:**

$$q_1 = q_2 = q$$

# Capacity region of the collision channel



-----  
**Time-sharing  
inner bound**

**Small alphabets: non-trivial use of silence and collision symbols**

**Large alphabets: time-sharing approaches the capacity**


# A mutual information game

$$R_1 \leq I(X_1; Y | X_2)$$

$$R_2 \leq I(X_2; Y | X_1)$$

$$R_1 + R_2 \leq I(X_1, X_2; Y) \longleftarrow \text{redundant}$$

**Each user maximizes its own maximum achievable rate**



**Actions**

Player 1 chooses  $P_{X_1}$

Player 2 chooses  $P_{X_2}$

**Pay-offs**

$$\mathcal{J}_1(P_{X_1}, P_{X_2}) = I(X_1; Y | X_2)$$

$$\mathcal{J}_2(P_{X_1}, P_{X_2}) = I(X_2; Y | X_1)$$

5. Berry and Tse, "Shannon Meets Nash on the Interference Channel", *IEEE Trans. IT* 2011

6. Médard, "Capacity of correlated jamming channels", *Allerton* 1997

7. Shaffie and Ulukus, "Mutual Information Games in Multiuser Channels with Corr. Jamming", *IEEE Trans. IT* 2009

# A mutual information game

Nash-equilibrium solution

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{J}_1(P_{X_1}^*, P_{X_2}^*) &\geq \mathcal{J}_1(P_{X_1}, P_{X_2}^*), \quad \forall P_{X_1} \\ \mathcal{J}_2(P_{X_1}^*, P_{X_2}^*) &\geq \mathcal{J}_2(P_{X_1}^*, P_{X_2}), \quad \forall P_{X_2}\end{aligned}$$

**Does a Nash-equilibrium exist?**


**Theorem 2**

The Nash-equilibrium solution **exists** and is **unique**

# Sketch of proof

Fixing  $P_{X_2}$

$$\mathcal{J}_1(P_{X_1}, P_{X_2}) \leq H(U_1) + \log q_1 \cdot \Pr(U_1 = 1) \cdot \Pr(U_2 = 0)$$




$$P_{X_i}^*(\theta_i) = \left[ \theta_i, \frac{1 - \theta_i}{q_i}, \dots, \frac{1 - \theta_i}{q_i} \right]$$

$$\tilde{\mathcal{J}}_1(\theta_1, \theta_2) \triangleq \mathcal{J}_1(P_{X_1}^*(\theta_1), P_{X_2}^*(\theta_2))$$

$$\tilde{\mathcal{J}}_1(\theta_1, \theta_2) = H_b(\theta_1) + \log q_1 \cdot \theta_1 \cdot (1 - \theta_2)$$

For every fixed  $\theta_2 \in [0, 1]$


$\tilde{\mathcal{J}}_1(\theta_1, \theta_2)$  is strictly concave on  $\theta_1$





# Reaction curves

$$\mathcal{R}_i(\theta_j) = \frac{1}{1 + q_i^{\theta_j}}$$



**Every Nash-equilibrium**  
lies on **both reaction curves**

Since they always **intersect** at a single point,  
the Nash-equilibrium **exists** and is **unique**



# Summary & future work

- 1. Fundamental limits of communication over the collision channel**
- 2. Trade-off between implicit channel vs. explicit channel**
- 3. Operation at the boundary requires centralized design (cooperation)**
- 4. Selfish behavior leads to a game**

## **1. Capacity of other types of collision channel:**

**i. feedback**

**ii. type II**

$$S = C$$

**iii. capture**



**2. Is the Nash-equilibrium stable? Price-of-Anarchy?**

**3. Are there practical codes for the collision channel?**



# Appendix

# Other deterministic MACs

## Binary Adder Channel



## Binary Multiplier Channel



# Computing the capacity region

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{maximize} && \mu R_1 + (1 - \mu) R_2 \\ &\text{subject to} && R_1 \leq I(X_1; Y | X_2) \\ & && R_2 \leq I(X_2; Y | X_1) \\ & && R_1 + R_2 \leq I(X_1, X_2; Y) \end{aligned}$$


with variables  $R_1, R_2, P_{X_1}, P_{X_2}$

**Theorem 1**

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{maximize} && \mu \left[ H_b(\theta_1) + \log q_1 \cdot (1 - \theta_1) \cdot \theta_2 \right] + (1 - \mu) \left[ H_b(\theta_2) + \log q_2 \cdot (1 - \theta_2) \cdot \theta_1 \right] \\ &\text{subject to} && 0 \leq \theta_i \leq 1, \quad i \in \{1, 2\} \end{aligned}$$


**Non-convex, in general**

# Networked decision systems



## Many applications

1. Networked control
2. Remote estimation
3. Sensor networks
4. Robotic networks



## Many challenges

**Communication is imperfect:**  
Delays, noise, quantization,  
congestion, packet drops, connectivity and  
**packet collisions**

1. Vasconcelos and Martins, "Optimal estimation over the collision channel", *IEEE TAC* 2017
2. Vasconcelos and Martins, "Remote estimation games over the shared networks", *Allerton* 2015